Tribal Water Quality Standards under the Clean Water Act: Protecting Traditional Cultural Uses by Galloway, William C.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 70 Number 1 
1-1-1995 
Tribal Water Quality Standards under the Clean Water Act: 
Protecting Traditional Cultural Uses 
William C. Galloway 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Water Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William C. Galloway, Notes and Comments, Tribal Water Quality Standards under the Clean Water Act: 
Protecting Traditional Cultural Uses, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 177 (1995). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol70/iss1/5 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright 0 1995 by Washington Law Rcvlcw Association
TRIBAL WATER QUALITY STANDARDS UNDER THE
CLEAN WATER ACT: PROTECTING TRADITIONAL
CULTURAL USES
William C. Galloway
Abstract- Since 1987, the Clean Water Act has allowed Indian tribes to be treated as states
for various purposes under the Act. Among the regulatory powers of states under the Clean
Water Act is the ability to set water quality standards, subject to approval by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Upstream pollution dischargers must comply with
a downstream state's water quality standards once it is established that an upstream discharge
demonstrably impacts downstream water quality. The power to set water quality standards
represents a new and potentially powerful tool to protect traditional uses and enhance
reservation environments, but only if tribes craft the standards carefully. The tribes'
successful exercise of this new regulatory authority will depend on the recognition and
successful negotiation of potential obstacles posed by the regulatory mechanism itself and the
case law addressing interstate disputes under the Clean Water Act and state-tribal disputes.
In 1987, Congress amended the Clean Water Act to allow Indian
tribes to be treated as states for several purposes under the Act. This
Comment addresses one of those purposes--determining water quality
standards binding on all pollution dischargers on or off-reservation
whose discharge impacts reservation waters. This regulatory authority
brings with it the opportunity for enhanced tribal sovereignty, as well as
the risk of conflicts with off-reservation dischargers who resist new tribal
authority. A long history of state-tribal conflicts over regulatory
jurisdiction makes such conflict more than likely. The existing law
addressing disputes between the states is likely to inform that conflict
considerably, and the peculiar status of the tribes under federal law and
the nature of tribal regulatory authority under the 1987 amendments will
also play a significant role in shaping this new area of law.
Part I of this Comment examines the history of federal Indian law as it
relates to the 1987 Clean Water Act amendments' broadening tribal
regulatory authority. Part II describes the Clean Water Act, focusing on
the role of water quality standards, the 1987 amendments and their
implementing regulations, and the United States Supreme Court's water
quality standards decisions. Part III examines City of Albuquerque v.
Browner,' in which a federal district court upheld the Environmental
Protection Agency's approval of water quality standards for the Pueblo
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988).
2. 865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993).
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of Isleta, which lies only a few miles down the Rio Gr-ande River from
the outfall of the city's wastewater treatment plant. Part IV examines the
process of adopting tribal water quality standards, s,;uggests possible
sources of conflict with surrounding non-Indian communities, and
proposes ways to avoid those conflicts.
I. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND REGULATION OF THE
RESERVATION ENVIRONMENT
The history of federal Indian law reflects many shifts in U.S.
government policy against a background of ongoing conflict between
Indian and non-Indian communities. Currently, and perhaps
permanently, tribes are 'in the Self-Determination Era, which is
characterized by a federal policy that encourages tribes to act on their
own behalf under federal supervision.
A. Self-Determination Policy-Government-to-Government
Relationship
In the 1820s and 30s, Chief Justice Marshall enunciated the basic legal
framework of federal Indian law in the Cherokee cases-a framework
that endures to this day. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,3 the Court
denied the tribe injunctive relief against non-Indian incursions into
Cherokee land under newly enacted Georgia state laws. Chief Justice
Marshall reasoned that Indian nations are not foreign nations. Under
Article III of the U.S. constitution, a tribe would have to be a foreign
nation to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; therefore
the Court declined jurisdiction.4 With words that have found their way
into much of the Court's subsequent Indian law jurisprudence, the Chief
Justice called the tribes "domestic dependent nations."5  Relations
between the tribes and the federal government have focused largely on
defining and redefining the nature of that domestic dependency. It is
only in the past twenty to twenty-five years, the so-called Self-
Determination Era, that Congress has chosen to foster the nationhood of
tribes, rather than attempting to assimilate tribal people into the dominant
culture.
3. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
4. Id. at 20.
5. Id. at 17.
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The Self-Determination Era began in 1970. In a message to
Congress,' President Nixon advocated tribal self-determination in the
form of the right to control and operate federal programs.7 He also
repudiated the Termination Era, during which Congress had sought with
disastrous results to assimilate Indian populations by disestablishing
reservations and ending the government-to-government relationship that
had been the cornerstone of Indian policy under the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934.8 Congressional action in response to that
policy change included, most notably, the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975.' That statute gives express authority
to the Secretaries of Interior and of Health and Human Services to
contract with, and make grants to, Indian tribes and other Indian
organizations for the delivery of federal services.
Regulation of reservation lands has been a contentious issue since the
establishment of the reservations, with states competing with tribal
governments and the federal government for regulatory control. State of
Washington, Department of Ecology v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency,"0 for example, raised the issue of whether states can
manage hazardous waste on reservations by delegated federal authority
under the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)." RCRA offers states the
opportunity to administer their own hazardous waste programs, subject to
approval by the Administrator of the EPA. Relying on a combination of
long-standing principles of Indian law and the norm of deference to
agencies' statutory interpretation, the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA
had correctly interpreted RCRA not to grant the State of Washington
jurisdiction over the activities of Indians on reservations."2 The state's
interim authorization to administer its own hazardous waste program
expressly excluded Indian lands because the EPA had concluded that the
state did not have the legal authority to exercise jurisdiction over
reservations. 3 The Supreme Court has held that, in order to grant a state
jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country, Congress must do so
6. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian
Policy, H.R. Doe. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
7. Id. at 4-5.
8. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
9. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 455-458e (1988 & Supp. 1993).
10. 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Washington Dep 't of Ecology].
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. 1993).
12. Washington Dep't ofEcology, 752 F.2d at 1472.
13. Id. at 1467.
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explicitly. 4 Because RCRA is unclear with respect to state regulatory
jurisdiction in Indian country, the court deferred to the EPA's reasonable
interpretation of the statute and thus denied the state jurisdiction.5 This
conflict is typical of state-tribal jurisdictional disputes; a stale, given the
opportunity, is likely to attempt to expand its regulatory authority within
its border as much as possible, notwithstanding the special status of
Indian land.
B. The EPA Policy Statement
On January 24, 1983, President Reagan promulgated his federal
Indian policy, which stressed two closely related approaches: "(1) that
the Federal Government will pursue the principle of Indian "self-
government" and (2) that it will work directly with Tribal Governments
on a "government-to-government" basis."'6
On November 8, 1984, Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus acted
on President Reagan's initiative by releasing the EPA's Indian Policy
(the Policy Statement), 7 containing both its policy statement and
guidance for its implementation. The agency recognized that, in many
cases, full implementation of the Policy Statement wold require not
only changes in the regulatory scheme but also statutory amendments.
Nonetheless, the agency saw that it could begin to address the underlying
procedural aspects of the implementation by, for example, involving
tribal governments in regulatory decisions concerning Indian country.
The EPA's exposition of its November 8, 1984 policy squarely
addresses the fundamental issue of tribal sovereignty at the core of the
President's statement above: that government-to-government relations
are the first step to Indian self-determination." The Policy Statement
explicitly described tribal jurisdiction as outside that of states or other
governments.' Further, the EPA recognized the primacy of tribal
governments in making both broad policy and specific regulatory
decisions on reservations. The agency also committed itself to fostering
the regulatory capabilities of tribal governments through consultation
14. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973).
15. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1472.
16. Environmental Protection Agency, Policy for the Administration qrEnvironmental Programs
on Indian Reservations 1 (Nov. 8, 1984) (on file with the Washington Lam, Review).
17. Id.
18. Id. at2.
19. Id.
I n-l
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and programmatic support." The EPA committed to work towards
removing legal and procedural impediments to cooperative efforts and to
act as a mediator of sorts in encouraging state and local governments to
work with tribes.2 ' On the federal front, the agency was to enlist other
agencies with jurisdiction and expertise-presumably the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, among others-in a common effort to promote tribal
sovereignty and assure compliance in Indian country with environmental
statutes and regulations.' Finally, the Policy Statement expressed the
EPA's commitment to program development and, most importantly, to
funding for implementation of the Policy Statement's goals."
The Implementation Guidance document, released at the same time as
the Policy Statement itself, formed an Indian Work Group, chaired by the
Director of the Office of Federal Activities at the EPA and composed of
representatives of key regional and headquarters offices, and outlined the
responsibilities and activities of that group. The group was to facilitate
initial efforts to identify specific projects most ripe for implementation.24
Initial directives included the following: (1) the Assistant Administrator
for External Affairs was to act as coordinator and clearinghouse for
Indian policy matters; (2) EPA General Counsel and each Regional and
Assistant Administrator were to be represented by a staff-person
empowered to speak on his or her behalf; (3) the Assistant and Regional
Administrators were to undertake active outreach with the tribes, with
the funding necessary to achieve policy goals; and (4) the outreach effort
was to consist of program development, consultation, and incorporation
of tribal concerns, needs, and preferences into EPA decision-making.'
By this comprehensive mechanism, the Implementation Guidance sought
to achieve the goals outlined in the Policy Statement by fashioning a new
cooperative mechanism for achieving compliance with environmental
statutes and regulations in Indian country in a manner consistent with the
principle of Indian self-government.26
20. Id. at 2-3.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Id. at 3-4.
23. Id. at 4.
24. Memorandum from Alvin L. Aim, Deputy Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency,
Indian Policy Implementation Guidance 2 (Nov. 8, 1984) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
25. Id. at 3-5.
26. Id. at 6.
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C. Tribal Regulatory Authority
Despite Nixon's proclamation of an era of self-determination and
President Reagan's self-determination-oriented Indian policy, and
despite the subsequent efforts of the EPA to follow those: mandates, tribal
ability to regulate reservation land owned in fee by non-Indians
continues to be hotly litigated. The U.S. Supreme Court, seemingly
working at cross purposes with the Congress and the Executive Branch's
self-determination policy, has issued two rulings limiting tribal
regulatory authority in Montana v. United States27 aMd Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima.28 Montana concerned the
ability of the tribe to regulate non-Indian hunting and trout fishing on fee
land within the boundaries of the Crow Reservation. It established the
current test for finding Indian regulatory authority over non-Indians,
which focuses on whether the non-Indians' conduct "threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe."'29 The opinion frames iihe discussion in
terms of retained tribal sovereignty and reflects a significant recognition
of tribal governmental authority. Presumably, environmental regulation,
which is designed to have a direct and positive impact on the health and
welfare of the tribe, would meet the Montana test.
In Brendale, the issue in two consolidated cases was the extent of
tribal zoning authority over two parcels of reservation land, both owned
by non-members, one a non-Indian and the other a non-member Indian
descended from a tribal member. The reservation is divided into two
parts: the "closed" area, which is closed to non-members, and the "open"
area, which is open to the general public.3" The open area is almost half
owned in fee by non-Indians." The case sought to resolve a conflict
between the tribe's zoning ordinance and the county';, both of which
claimed to regulate fee lands held by non-Indians.
Two different parties wanted to use their land in ways that conflicted
with the Yakama32 tribal zoning scheme. One party, Wilkinson, a non-
Indian, wanted to subdivide 32 of his 40 acres into 20 lots for single-
family homes. Though permissible under the "general rural" zoning
27. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
28. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
29. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
30. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 415.
31. Id. at 416.
32. The Yakima Nation now spells its name "Yakama."
Vol. 70:177, 1995
Tribal Water Quality Standards
category under the county's ordinance, Wilkinson's proposed land use
was impermissible under the Yakama zoning scheme, which classified
his land as agricultural. Because, as the parties agreed, Wilkinson's
project did not imperil any interest of the tribe, the Court held his land to
be exempt from tribal zoning authority and subject to the county's. 33
Discussing Wilkinson's land, Justice Stevens stated his rationale:
"Because the open area no longer maintains the character of a unique
tribal asset and because the Tribe accordingly lacks a substantial interest
in governing land use, the power to zone has 'become outmoded.'
34
Justice Stevens did not, however, define what constitutes a "unique tribal
asset" nor on what basis a court far from the tribe is to decide that issue.
Although the tribe is probably best qualified to make such a
determination, asking the tribe raises questions of bias because it has a
vested interest in a finding that the territory in dispute is a "unique tribal
asset," while a federal judge will undoubtedly lack the background to
make a sound decision on this point. It is difficult to predict outcomes
under a rule whose critical component is undefined.
The other party challenging tribal regulatory authority in the
consolidated case was Brendale, an Indian who was not a tribal member
but was descended from a tribal member who had been allotted a 160-
acre parcel near the center of the forested portion of the closed area.
Brendale proposed to develop one of his platted 20-acre parcels into ten
2-acre lots to be sold as summer cabin sites, in contravention of the
Yakama Nation's ordinance. Brendale's land was in an area that was
largely tribal land, unlike Wilkinson's land, which was in an area
substantially owned in fee by non-Indians. The Court focused on the
power to exclude that is the hallmark of Justice Stevens's property-rights
analysis.35 In the Court's view, if the tribe could designate an area of the
reservation "closed"-a right not disputed by the Court-then it could
certainly exclude all but tribal members, with the exception of inholders
like Brendale. The Court found that zoning by the county was
inappropriate, meeting the Montana test; zoning in the closed area had a
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health and welfare of the tribe.36
33. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 432.
34. Id. at 447 (Stevens, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 433.
36. Id. at 444.
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Public comment on the EPA's proposed rule on ireating tribes as
states under the 1987 Clean Water Act amendments37 focused on
Brendale. One such comment asserted that Brendale foreclosed treating
the tribes as states for the purposes of regulating water quality on non-
Indian fee lands within the resenation. In response to this comment, the
EPA pointed to the distinction drawn by the U.S. Supreme Court
between land use planning, which chooses particular uses for the land,
and environmental regulation, which requires control of damage to the
environment without specifying uses.38 The EPA further noted that the
Court had relied on the land-use/environmental distinction to support a
finding that states retain authority to regulate the environment even
where their ability to regulate land use is preempted by federal law.39
The EPA also found that tribal regulation met the Montana test, because
any impairment of water quality from activities on non-Indian fee lands
is "very likely" to impair the water and critical habitat quality on tribal
lands.4" In addition, the EPA noted that in the legislative history of the
1987 amendments, Congress expressed a preference for tribal regulation
of surface water quality to assure achievement of the goals of the Clean
Water Act.4'
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,42 which severely circumscribed
the police power of tribal governments against non-Indians, however,
presents a potential obstacle to vigorous enforcement of tribal regulations
against non-members. In Oliphant, the Court held that Indian tribal
courts do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, even when
they commit crimes on the reservation.43 The EPA addressed this
problem when it issued its final rule for implementalion of the 1987
Clean Water Act amendments by providing that when a tribe lacks the
necessary criminal enforcement authority, the EPA may act on behalf of
the tribe to enforce its water pollution permit program.'
In the implementation guidelines, the EPA provides for direct federal
action against tribal facilities based on a determination that sounds,
ironically, very much like the Montana test. The first prong of the test,
37. See infra part II.
38. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,879 (1991).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 64,878.
41. Id.
42. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
43. Id. at 212.
44. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,892 (1991).
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which provides for EPA intervention only where it determines that there
is a significant threat to human health or the environment, asks the
Montana question." The second prong involves an examination of
expectations of timely success in bringing the tribal facility into
compliance and a discussion of the availability of alternatives that would
achieve equally timely results. 6
Both the president and EPA have consistently reaffirmed the goal of
government-to-government relations. On June 14, 1991, President Bush
designated his Director of Intergovernmental Affairs in the White House
to act as his personal liaison to all Indian tribes.47 On July 10, 1991, EPA
Administrator William Reilly distributed widely within the agency for
subsequent distribution to states and tribal governments a memorandum
regarding the Agency's Indian policy.4" Included with that memorandum
was a Concept Paper designed to formalize the Agency's role in
strengthening tribal management of reservation environmental programs.
It acknowledges that a healthy environment is more than an amenity; it is
essential to preservation of the reservation itself.49 This deference to
tribal values is an important outcome of the self-determination policy.
Indian tribes have understandable and long-standing concerns about
preserving the reservation land base, particularly given past federal
assimilationist policies like the Dawes Act.50  The Dawes Act, which
mandated the allotment of tribal lands to individual tribal members and
sale of remaining "surplus" reservation lands to non-Indians, initiated the
Allotment Era, which saw the reduction, plot by plot, of the acreage in
Indian country from 138 million to 52 million acres.5 The Indian
Reorganization Act of 193452 halted this dramatic reduction in Indian
lands. This background forms the foundation for the EPA's recognition
that tribes view environmental degradation as yet another inroad into
45. Aim, supra note 24, at 6.
46. Id.
47. Office of the Press Secretary (Los Angeles, Cal.), Statement by the President: Reaffirming the
Government-to-Government Relationship Between the Federal Government and Tribal Governments
(June 14, 1991) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
48. Memorandum from William K. Reilly, EPA Administrator, to Assistant Administrators,
General Counsel, Inspector General, Regional Administrators, Associate Administrators, and State
Office Directors (July 10, 1991) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
49. Environmental Protection Agency, Federal, Tribal and State Roles in the Protection and
Regulation of Reservation Environments 1 (July 10, 1991) (on file with the Washington Law
Review) (hereinafter EPA Concept Paper).
50. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334,339,341-342, 348-349,354,381 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
5 1. Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law 8 (1987).
52. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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their land base, and that pollution prevention constitutes tribal self-
preservation. 3 The tribes trust no one but themselves to regulate the
reservation environment, given the federal government's failure in the
past to protect the tribal land base and the tribes' long-standing
difficulties with state governments.
For their part, state governments have asserted their solidarity with
non-Indian business-owners and residents on the reservations.54 These
non-Indians and non-member Indians lack voting power on the
reservations. States thus argue that they must be able to regulate on-
reservation, lest the tribal government act in a discriminatory fashion.
The states' arguments ring hollow. Many U.S. cilizens do business
and live in other countries without complaining that they cannot directly
influence local politics. The situation for non-Indians on reservations
does differ from their status in foreign countries, since they can never
become tribal members. Tribes' desire for economic development,
however, creates a strong incentive for them to give non-Indian
businesses favorable treatment, even extending to limited waivers of
tribal sovereign immunity in contracts with non-Indians.
Against this background of acknowledgment of the tribal interest in
securing a healthy environment, the EPA Concept Paper prescribes
principles and procedures for the EPA action. The EPA refuses to allow
checkerboarding of regulatory authority on reservations, viewing them as
single administrative units and allowing tribal or state governments to
manage reservation programs only where a governmen.t can demonstrate
jurisdiction over pollution sources reservation-wide.55 In cases in which
a tribe cannot demonstrate jurisdiction over one or more sources, the
EPA will regulate directly.56
The EPA Concept Paper expresses the goal of cooperative
relationships between tribes and the non-Indian community, citing the
joint RCRA program developed by the state of Wisconsin and the
Menominee Tribe.57 In order to obtain community input into tribal rule-
making, the EPA encourages tribes to develop administrative procedure
acts because EPA regulations typically require public participation prior
to approval of new regulations." Such participation involves the non-
53. EPA Concept Paper, supra note 49, at 1.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 3-4.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id.
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Indian reservation residents in decision-making-involvement they
would be denied under many standard tribal procedures, since they are
non-members and cannot vote. Where there is a dispute between a state
and a tribe, the EPA agrees to act as "moderator" for discussions, unless
the governing statute designates another role."
II. CLEAN WATER ACT
A. Section 518-The 1987 Amendment Offering Tribes Status as States
In 1987, Congress undertook a dramatic realization of its self-
determination policy for the Indian nations when it amended the Clean
Water Act. Congress added Section 518 in the 1987 amendments, 0
making tribes eligible for treatment as states. Subsection (e) provides in
relevant part:
The Administrator [of the EPA] is authorized to treat an Indian
tribe as a State for purposes of subchapter II of this chapter and
sections 1254, 1256, 1313, 1315, 1318, 1319, 1324, 1329, 1341,
1342, and 1344 of this title to the degree necessary to carry out the
objectives of this section .... 61
The listed opportunities for exercising regulatory authority include
establishing water quality standards, various reporting functions,
monitoring, enforcement, certification of compliance with water quality
standards by prospective federal licensees and permit-holders, National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting, and
dredge and fill permitting. Section 518 also contemplates grants for a
wide range of research, pollution control and prevention programs, and
clean lakes programs.
In order to qualify for treatment as a state, the tribe must prove (1) that
it has a government that carries out "substantial governmental duties and
powers;" (2) that its program targets tribal lands; and (3) that the tribe is
capable of administering its program in a manner that is consistent with
applicable law and regulations." Passing this test requires a fairly
substantial infrastructure, including technical expertise. After the
59. Id. at 5.
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988).
61. Id. § (e).
62. Id.
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Administrator's approval of a tribe's application, the tribe can begin to
exercise regulatory authority in the same manner as states.
B. Water Quality Standards
Section 303 of the Clean Water Act provides that water quality
standards consist of designated uses and water quality criteria based on
those uses.63 Designated uses are codified by assigning water bodies or
portions of them to classes and defining the classes by reference to use.
States often use a system promulgated in 1980 by the EPA, which
suggests classifying waters for any of three designated uses: recreational
use, fisheries, or industrial use. Most states have separate classifications
for especially high-quality waters of recreational or ecological
significance.'
In addition to designated uses, the standards also include pollutant
criteria, which can be expressed in three different ways. The EPA's
preferred mode is through numerical values (e.g., parts per million), such
as those for conventional pollutants like fecal coliform bacteria,
dissolved oxygen, phosphorus, total suspended particulates, total
dissolved solids, and acidity.65 Bioassay results are a second method,
encompassing such humane measures as the LCSO value, which
determines the concentration of a pollutant that will il one half of a
given number of test organisms. 6 The third method, upheld in the D.C.
Circuit,67 is narrative criteria: such aspirational statements as "free from
substances attributable to man-caused point source . . . discharges" that
result in undesired consequences like objectionable color, odor, or taste.6"
Toxic pollutants are also addressed by water quality standards, both in
terms of specific criteria and catch-all narratives condemning toxics.69
For example, an inorganic toxin like DDT can be present in the aquatic
food chain without being detectable in water, since inorganic toxins can
be insoluble in water.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (1988).
64. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law 344 (2d ed. 1994).
65. Id. at 342-43.
66. Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Stanlards Under the Clean
Water Act, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1205 (1983) (citing EPA, Draft Water Quality Standards
Handbook (1982)).
67. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1981), affg 13
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1867 (D.D.C. 1979).
68. Gaba, supra note 66, at 1205 n.192.
69. Id.
'Vol. 70:177, 1995
Tribal Water Quality Standards
The 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act created a dominant role
for effluent standards in the regulation of pollution discharge by use of
permits under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) and relegated water quality standards to an important but
interstitial function." Water quality standards can be significant,
however, especially when a downstream state or tribe adopts or revises
them in ways that can impact NPDES permit-holders in upstream states
or on upstream reservations. Section 301(b)(1)(C) of the Clean Water
Act7 provides for the incorporation of water quality standards into the
permitting process, establishing those standards as a benchmark for
setting effluent discharge limits. In fact, many provisions in NPDES
permits exist solely to satisfy the additional obligations created by the
water quality standards.72
C. The EPA Rule-making on Tribal Water Quality Standards
On December 12, 1991, the EPA issued its final rule for reservation
water quality standards.73 In response to public comments, the EPA
addressed such issues as the scope of tribal regulatory authority74 and the
procedural requirements for tribes to prove their regulatory capabilities.75
Defining the geographical scope of tribal authority, the EPA included not
only lands within a reservation but also trust lands formally set aside for
the use of Indians, even if not denominated "reservation."76 When there
are risks of conflict of interest, such as where a tribe is issuing a permit
to a tribal agency, the EPA chose not to require a demonstration of
separation of powers but, instead, opted to consider such issues in the
process of delegating NPDES permitting authority,77 presumably on a
case-by-case basis.
The EPA also addressed the issue of resolving disputes between tribes
and states over water quality standards. The Agency chose a decidedly
middle-ground approach, refusing to disapprove either a state or a tribal
standard as a means of resolution.7" Doing so would have required the
70. Rodgers, supra note 64, at 350-51.
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1988).
72. Rodgers, supra note 64, at 349.
73. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (1991).
74. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
75. 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,881.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 64,882.
78. Id. at 64,886-87.
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EPA to promulgate a less stringent federal standard and impinge on the
authority of states and tribes to set standards more restrictive than the
federal minimums. Congress's explicit grant of regulatory authority to
tribes did not include Section 510, which allows states to set water
quality standards in excess of the statutory minimums.79 Despite this
omission, the EPA affirmed its reading of the 1987 amendments to grant
tribes the same right states have: to establish water quality standards in
excess of those mandated as minimums in the statute and regulations."
In addition, the Agency refused to set a time limit for dispute resolution,
arguing that flexibility is necessary to achieve an cptimal outcome.8'
The EPA also chose not to define what constitutes an "unreasonable
consequence" triggering the dispute resolution process, opting instead to
vest regional administrators with the discretion to initiate dispute
resolution in appropriate circumstances.8 2
The EPA also described three options for setting t.ibal water quality
standards, spanning a range from least resource-intensive to most. First,
a tribe may negotiate a cooperative agreement with an. adjoining state to
apply state standards. 3 Second, the tribe may adopt the adjoining state's
standards, with or without revision. Finally, a tribe may adopt
standards independently to account for unique site-specific conditions
and designated uses.85 For example, three Rio Grande pueblos, the
Pueblos of Isleta, Sandia, and San Juan, have all designated the Rio
Grande as "primary contact ceremonial use and primary contact
recreational use."86 The EPA also chose to allow tribes a full three-year
review cycle in which to develop their standards." In order to assist
tribes in developing standards, the EPA issued a reference guide to water
quality standards for Indian tribes in January 1990 and held an
informational meeting for tribes on August 28-30, 1990, in Denver,
Colorado. The standards of the state where the reservation is located
apply during the interim period when tribal standards are under
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
80. 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,886.
81. Id. at 64,887.
82. Id. at 64,888.
83. Id. at 64,889.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Tribes prefer not to elaborate on what ceremonial use entails, other than that, like recreational
use, it can involve some ingestion of water. See, e.g., City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp.
733, 740 (D.N.M. 1993).
87. 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,889.
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development,88 though the rule does not designate who is responsible for
enforcing those standards. Federal promulgation of standards occurs
only as a last resort.89
The 1991 rule also briefly addresses the issues of groundwater and
Indian reserved water rights. It enumerates the two specific instances in
which the Agency regulates underground waters: (1) when there is a
direct hydrological connection between groundwater and surface waters
and (2) when the subterranean component is sufficiently stream-like that
fish and other aquatic life move between the surface and underground
portions of the water body.9 Although Sections 101(g)9' and 518(a)92
are unambiguous in not affecting state quantitative water rights, the
regulations implementing Section 518 reaffirm that water quality
standards have no impact on rights to quantities of water.93
The 1991 regulations also specify the process for tribes to obtain
treatment as states and outline the dispute resolution mechanism. Like
the statute,94 the regulation requires (1) that the tribe be federally
recognized; (2) that the tribe have a governing body carrying out
substantial governmental duties and powers; (3) that the tribal regulatory
program pertain to waters in Indian country; and (4) that the tribe, in the
Regional Administrator's judgment, be capable of carrying out an
effective water quality standards program in a manner consistent with the
Clean Water Act and applicable regulations.95 The regulations also
specify the form of documentation of those requirements, as well as the
process by which the Regional Administrator will provide notice of
consideration of the application and its approval, where applicable.96
The available dispute resolution mechanisms include mediation, non-
binding arbitration, or a default dispute resolution mechanism. 97 The
default mechanism involves appointment by the Regional Administrator
of a single official or panel, which will issue a written recom-
mendation.98 All of the dispute resolution options are voluntary, and
88. Id. at 64,991.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 64,892.
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1988) (authority of states over water).
92. Id. § 1377(a) (1988) (provisions of§ 518 to be carried out in accordance with § 101(g)).
93. 40 C.F.RL § 131.4 (1993).
94. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
95. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a)(1)-(4) (1993).
96. Id. § 131.8(b)-(c).
97. Id. § 131.7(f).
98. Id. § 131.7(f)(3).
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their recommendations are not binding; however, the expense and delay
of litigating disputes makes recourse to the dispute resolution probable.
D. The Supreme Court's Water Quality Standards Jurisprudence
The history of hostility between tribes and states indicates that
disputes are inevitable under the new regulatory scheme created by the
EPA's 1991 rule. It seems equally inevitable that despite the rule's
dispute resolution mechanisms, a significant number of these
controversies will lead to litigation. In fact, although only four tribes
have established water quality standards as of December 1994, such a
dispute has already reached federal district court.99 Analysis of three
cases, where the Supreme Court has resolved interstate disputes
regarding water quality, establishes a framework for predicting the
outcome of state-tribal disputes in the district courts, as is clear from
litigation regarding the Pueblo of Isleta's water quality standards in the
District of New Mexico. 100
1. Milwaukee II
The Supreme Court had its first opportunity to resolve an interstate
dispute under the 1972 Clean Water Act amendments in Milwaukee v.
Illinois. °' At issue was the availability of federal common law after
passage of the 1972 amendments. Illinois alleged public nuisance
resulting from inadequate treatment of sewage at Milwaukee's
wastewater treatment plant and from storm water overflows, which
caused direct discharge of untreated sewage into Lake Michigan and
which in turn carried the pollutants to Illinois. In an earlier related
decision, the Court had held that, because federal laws were not the only
remedy available at that time, Illinois could avail itself of a federal
common law action in district court. The Court declined original
jurisdiction because the dispute was only between a state and a party in
another state, not between two states. 2 Illinois duly filed suit in federal
district court, but, in the interim, Congress passed the 1972 Clean Water
Act. When the dispute returned to the Supreme Court, it held, in an
99. See infra part M.
100. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
101. 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee 11).
102. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101 (1972) (Milwaukee I).
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opinion by Justice Rehnquist, that the 1972 amendments preempted any
remedy at federal common law. 3
The Court's preemption analysis focused on the comprehensiveness of
the 1972 amendments. Distinguishing preemption of state law, where
preemption must be express or forcefully implied by Congress, the Court
articulated its assumption that Congress, not the courts, should set the
standards to be applied under federal law."° Thus it found a structural
limitation on the development of federal common law-where Congress
has chosen to regulate, the courts' function is to enforce that statutory
scheme, notwithstanding any federal common law, conflicting or not.
Looking to legislative history, the Court found clear intent to regulate
comprehensively, reaffirming its similar conclusion in an earlier case.' °5
Given the unavailability of an action under federal common law, Illinois'
only recourse besides a Clean Water Act suit was to petition the
permitting authority in Wisconsin-a remedy that Illinois had failed to
seek."a Though the Court did not make much of the fact, it did remark
that the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources had undertaken
enforcement action to bring Milwaukee's wastewater treatment system
into compliance with federally mandated effluent standards.0 7
Milwaukee H essentially limits tribes to bringing action under federal
statutes for enforcement of their water quality standards, since state
courts are likely to be hostile to tribal plaintiffs. While, in theory, a tribe
might bring a nuisance action in state court, the history of state-tribe
relations makes success in, and therefore the bringing of, such a suit
unlikely. For example, in Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Association v. Tollefson,05 the Washington State Supreme
Court held that implementing a federal district court ruling on Indian
treaty fishing rights would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by treating Indians
differently from non-Indian citizens. 9  In United States v.
Washington,"0 the so-called Boldt decision, the federal district court held
103. Milwaukee H, 451 U.S. at 317-19.
104. Id. at 316-17.
105. Id. at 318-19 (citing Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975)).
106. Id. at 326.
107. Id. at311.
108. 89 Wash. 2d 276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977), vacated sub nom. Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
109. Id. at 285-86, 571 P.2d at 1378.
110. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), af'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1086 (1976).
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that under the Stevens treaties of 1854-55, Indians are entitled to fifty
percent of the Pacific northwest fishing harvest. The Washington court,
however, ignored several long-standing tenets of Indian law, basing its
holding on the injustice of giving 0.028 percent of the pDpulation at large
fifty percent of the fishing resource."' Such an assertion is directly
contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
Shoshone Tribe"2 that treaties are to be construed as fe Indians would
have understood them at the time of signing."' Such hostility to the
fights of Indians bodes ill for any state law nuisance action brought by a
tribe to enforce its water quality standards."4
2. International Paper Company v. Ouellette
The Court revisited interstate water quality dispute; in International
Paper Company v. Ouellette,"5 where the Court addressed the issue of
which state's law to apply to an interstate water quality dispute.
Ouellette and the other plaintiffs were property owners on the Vermont
shore of Lake Champlain, which forms a portion of the New York-
Vermont border. International Paper Company operates a pulp and paper
mill on the New York side of the lake and discharges effluent into the
lake by means of a pipe which ends a short distance frcm the border that
divides the lake. Plaintiffs/respondents alleged a "continuing nuisance"
under Vermont common law, and asked for damages and injunctive
relief."6 The Court held that state law actions must be resolved under the
laws of the state where the source is located." 7 The Court based its
holding on the subordinate role that states play under the Clean Water
Act in regulating pollution that originates beyond their boundaries."'
Since they lack authority to block issuance of permits in other states,
affected states are relegated to an advisory role, with an opportunity to be
heard by the issuing authority." 9  The Administrator, however, may
Ill. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 89 Wash. 2d at 285, 571
P.2d at 1378.
112. 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
113. Id. atll6.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) ("Because of the local ill
feeling, the people of the states where [Indians] are found are often their deadliest enemies.").
115. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
116. Id. at 484.
117. Id. at 487.
118. Id. at490-91.
119. Id.
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block the permit if he or she concludes that the discharge in question will
have an undue impact on interstate waters. 20 The Court also pointed to
the potential for chaos if the regulated community were to be subject to
the plenary authority of several governments-an outcome belied by the
comprehensiveness of the Clean Water Act and the predictability of its
regulatory scheme.' The Court stopped short of preempting all state
law, however, reasoning that application of the source state's nuisance
law would not disturb the balance struck in the Clean Water Act between
federal, source-state, and affected-state interests.' 2 Finally, the Court
rejected the paper company's forum argument that only state courts
should hear these disputes and held that a district court sitting in
diversity is competent to hear the case and apply the law of the source
state.' 1
Ouellette is a more hopeful ruling from the standpoint of tribes.
Despite the potential application of state law to water quality standards
enforcement actions, tribes still have the opportunity to be heard in
federal court, rather than risking a hostile state court.
3. Arkansas v. Oklahoma
In Arkansas v. Oklahoma,2 4 the Supreme Court reached the issue of
enforcement of out-of-state water quality standards against NPDES
permit-holders. The City of Fayetteville, Arkansas, had applied in 1985
for a NPDES permit for its new sewage treatment plant. The permit was
duly issued. Oklahoma challenged the permit in administrative
proceedings before the EPA on the basis that the permitted discharge
would violate water quality standards for the Illinois River, designated as
a "scenic river area."'" Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens held (1)
that the EPA's decision to require the City of Fayetteville's sewage
treatment plant to comply with a downstream state's standards was a
reasonable exercise of the discretion granted to the EPA by statute,'26 and
(2) that allowing the discharge to continue was also an acceptable
exercise of statutory discretion in enforcement of standards where no
120. Id.
121. Id. at 496-97.
122. Id. at 498-99.
123. Id. at 500.
124. 112S. Ct. 1046 (1992).
125. Id. at 1051 &n.3.
126. Id. at 1057.
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harm to the river had been demonstrated by the downstream state. 27 The
Court found that, while Oklahoma could not veto issuance of the permit,
the Administrator retained the authority to block any permit that would
not comply with the Clean Water Act. 28
III. CONFLICTS BETWEEN TRIBES AND NON-INDIANS OVER
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
The only litigation to date xegarding tribal water' quality standards
involved a challenge by a city faced with major overhaul of its
wastewater treatment plant to comply with a downstream tribe's newly
issued water quality standards. In City of Albuquerque v. Browner,'29 the
federal district court upheld the EPA's approval of water quality
standards submitted by the Pueblo of Isleta. 3° Having recognized the
tribe's status as a state for purposes of the Clean Water Act, the EPA
approved its standards on December 24, 1992. The city challenged that
approval and moved for a temporary restraining order and then for a
preliminary injunction; both motions were denied.'' In its complaint,
the city made three allegations: (1) that the EPA had failed to follow the
required approval procedures; (2) that the Agency had misinterpreted
two provisions of the Clean Water Act in approving the standards; and
(3) that the EPA had approved standards that are unconstitutional.' 2
The court reviewed the EPA's decision under the Administrative
Procedure Act, using an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. The court
framed its inquiry as "whether the agency based its decision on relevant
evidence a reasonable mind might accept as appropriate to support such a
decision."'3  Asserting the narrowness of its standard of review, the
court noted the broad discretion afforded an agency when faced with
conflicting technical opinions, even to the point of affirming a reasoned
decision contrary to the one at which the court itself might arrive.134
Even if the court were to find that the agency had acted arbitrarily or
127. Id. at 1060.
128. Id. at 1055 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2), which provides for notce to and review by the
Administrator of all permits).
129. 865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993).
130. Id. at 741.
131. Id. at 736.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 737.
134. Id.
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outside the scope of its authority, it would remand to the agency for
reconsideration." 5
In its review of the EPA's approval procedures, the court found that
the agency had met all statutory requirements. The city first challenged
the EPA's failure to hold public hearings regarding its approval of the
tribe's standards. The court found that the Clean Water Act requires that
EPA and states give notice when they promulgate standards.'36 The tribe
had provided notice of a hearing held August 7, 1991, and an opportunity
for comment prior to submission of its standards to the EPA.'37
In response to the city's assertion of statutory misinterpretation by the
agency, the court also upheld the EPA's interpretation of Section 518138
as incorporating Section 510,"' which allows states to set more stringent
standards than the minimum required by the Act. 4 ' Reasoning that
limiting tribes to the federal minimum standards would render Section
518 essentially meaningless, the court also pointed to the principle of
federal Indian law, which requires interpretation of Section 510 as a
savings clause, recognizing sovereignty retained by the tribes, like that of
the states.'4 '
The city also challenged the failure of the EPA's dispute resolution
mechanism to allow anyone other than the state or tribe to initiate the
process. Although the EPA did consider in its rule-making whether
affected parties should be involved in the resolution process, it
determined only that they could be invited to participate.'42 Allowing
only states and tribes to initiate the process was a reasonable regulatory
interpretation of the statute, since they are the only entities authorized to
revise or modify the standards.'43
The city's constitutional argument alleged a violation of the
Establishment Clause because enforcement of the tribe's standards aimed
at protecting ceremonial uses of the river constituted imposition of a
mandate aiding tribal religion at the expense of the city.'" Reasoning
135. Id.
136. Id. at 739.
137. Id.
138. 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988).
139. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
140. City ofAlbuquerque, 865 F. Supp. at 740.
141. Id. at 739.
142. Id. at 740.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 740.
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that the standard, which contemplates some ingestion of water, resembles
a fishable/swimmable standard that is one of the goals of the Clean
Water Act, the court found that the tribe's designation of a ceremonial
use did not invalidate the overall secular goals of the Act-quite the
contrary, in fact.145 There was no "excessive entanglement" between
government and religion.'46
The city also argued that the standards were unconstitutionally vague,
but the court summarily rejected this argument. 47 First, the court found
that narrative descriptions are permissible under the EPA regulations.'48
The court also pointed out that it is the NPDES permit, :aot the standards
themselves, that governs the city's conduct.'49
Finally, the court addressed the attainability of the tribe's standards.
Despite the city's concerns about the expense of compliance, the court
found that the "EPA lacks the authority to reject stringent standards on
the grounds of harsh economic or social effects."'50 Although the city
argued that the tribe should include provisions for periods of low flow,
the tribe replied that, because ceremonial use is more intensive during
low-flow periods, it would be inappropriate to relax the standards at
those times.' On the basis of agency deference, the court refused to
require modification.'52
The court raised one prospective question, looking to the city's draft
modified NPDES permit. Citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma,'53 the court
questioned the EPA's inclusion of limits in the city's NPDES permit in
order to meet the tribe's standards without first concluding that the
quality of the river five miles downstream would be measurably
improved. In addition, the city's drinking water source, an aquifer,
contains arsenic at higher levels than natural background in the river, and
thus higher than the tribe's standards allow. Thus, the city's
uncontaminated drinking water could constitute an actionable pollutant.
Furthermore, it was not clear that currently available technology could
meet or measure progress towards the tribe's standard. Hence, the court
145. Id.
146. Id. at 740-41.
147. Id. at 741.
148. Id. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
149. Id. at 742.
150. Id. at 741.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
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was concerned both about the efficacy of limitations in protecting the
tribe's water quality and about the ability of the city to meet the
standards with available technology. The court, however, declined to
reach the issue, since the NPDES permit was not before the court. 54
In April 1994, Albuquerque, the New Mexico Environment
Department, the EPA, and the tribe entered into a Stipulation and
Agreement 5. to resolve all questions raised in the reissuance of the city's
NPDES permit, including the pueblo's water quality standards. In that
agreement, all parties waived any right to challenge the reissued
permit. 56 Among the other provisions is one requiring a water quality
study focusing on arsenic, aluminum, cyanide, and silver in the Rio
Grande River. Thus, despite the reluctance of the non-Indian community
to accept Indian regulatory jurisdiction, a workable compromise was
achieved.
Other kinds of disputes are likely to arise under the new tribal water
quality standards. One likely source of conflict is objections to tribal
regulation of non-Indian fee owners on reservations. Though no
documentation is available because the matter is still pending, the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation in
Montana have applied for treatment as a state. Their application has
been at the EPA for two years, apparently delayed by the objections of
non-Indian fee owners, though officials at the EPA headquarters were
unwilling to discuss the matter in May 1994.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRIBAL WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS
Avoiding conflict with non-Indians is certainly the optimal approach
to implementing tribal water quality standards. Through careful
designation of uses and thoughtful selection of pollutant criteria, tribes
can protect traditional and other water and attendant land uses without
precipitating conflict. To affect the operation of an upstream facility, a
tribe must demonstrate that the facility demonstrably impacts water
quality. Unlike the strict-liability scheme of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
57
(CERCLA), where anyone who has disposed of hazardous waste at an
154. City ofAlbuquerque, 865 F. Supp. at 742.
155. On file with the Washington Law Review.
156. Id. at 2-3.
157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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offfending site is liable for the entire cost of cleanup, regardless of a
demonstrated source of the environmental damage, the Clean Water Act
places a heavy burden of proof for the downstream state or tribe to meet
the standard of Arkansas v. Oklahoma-i.e., direct causation. This
section addresses the options available to tribes in undertaking Section
518 regulatory authority and addresses potential for conflict.
A. Designated Uses
Designating uses is the first step in establishing standards, once a tribe
has achieved status as a state. In 1980, the EPA published a system for
designating uses. That system suggested three options: recreational,
fisheries, or industrial use. Four tribes, the Pueblos of Isleta, Sandia, and
San Juan, as well as the Puyallup of Washington, have EPA-approved
standards. 118  The three pueblos have each gone outside the EPA
guidance, however, and designated portions of the Rio Grande river as
"primary contact ceremonial use.""' 9 The district court's recognition of
traditional, spiritual uses of water as a valid designated use under the
Clean Water Act is probably the most significant aspect of City of
Albuquerque, since native people have had great difficulty persuading
the courts to recognize and protect their spiritual values regarding their
lands. 60 Northwest tribes are likely to submit applications for treatment
as a state to the EPA, with the express goal of protecting hatchery water
quality from upstream discharges. 6 '
B. Pollutant Criteria
The greatest potential for conflict lies in the designation of pollutant
criteria. The pollutant criteria, to be effective, must be set at levels that
are both measurable and attainable. Though this issue was beyond the
scope of the district court's inquiry in City ofAlbuquerque v. Browner,62
the court did express concern that the tribe's arsenic standard might
158. Electronic correspondence from Patti Morris, EPA, to author (Jan. 10, 1995) (on file with the
Washington Law Review). The Seminole of Florida have received approval -or treatment as a state.
Santa Clara Pueblo, Nambe Pueblo, Picuris Pueblo, and Povonque Pueblo await EPA approval of
both their applications for treatment as states and their water quality standards. The Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead reservation await approval of their application for
treatment as a state. Id.
159. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
161. The author is assisting the Suquamish Tribe with its application for treatment as a state.
162. 865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993). See supra notes 129-54 and accompanying text.
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present enforcement problems. Because the background level of arsenic
in the groundwater that is Albuquerque's drinking water source is higher
than that of the Rio Grande, the city argued against its approval, since
meeting that standard would require it to remove arsenic below naturally
occurring levels. A further difficulty is the ability of currently available
technology to measure the difference. In Arkansas v. Oklahoma,163 the
Court found that it was an acceptable exercise of the EPA's statutory
discretion to allow a discharge to continue at the risk of violating the
downstream state's water quality standards, so long as the downstream
state had failed to demonstrate harm to the river.' An unenforced water
quality standard is of little use; thus, tribes should give careful
consideration to both measurability and attainability.
A tribe has three options for setting standards. The first is to negotiate
a cooperative agreement with an adjoining state to apply that state's
standards. 65 Tribes may be reluctant to undertake this option, despite its
apparent convenience, given the history of animosity between state and
tribal governments. Concerned about the appearance of abdicating
sovereignty, a tribe may choose to promulgate standards different from
the adjoining state's, even when the state's standards might be
sufficiently protective of tribal resources. Here, the goal of conflict
avoidance may have to give way to concerns over protecting tribal
sovereignty, since adoption of state standards may limit a tribe's ability
to alter them in the future to meet new needs or threats.
A second option involves adopting the adjoining state's designated
uses and pollutant criteria, with or without modification. 66 This course
of action enables the tribe to exercise directly its regulatory authority
without undertaking the rather resource-intensive process of developing
its designated uses and pollutant criteria from scratch. Since the
adjoining state has presumably done substantial scientific investigation to
meet the statutory requirements for developing water quality standards,
the tribe can take advantage of that investigative work and modify the
standards to meet the special needs of the reservation or other tribal
property. This option allows the tribe to retain control and avoid any
appearance of giving up sovereign powers.
163. 112 S. Ct. 1046(1992).
164. Id. at 1060.
165. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,889 (1991) (final rule on tribal water quality standards).
166. Id.
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The final option, adopting standards independently, 7 is both the most
resource-intensive and the most likely to produce disputes with
surrounding NPDES permit-holders. Resistant to change, permit-holders
are increasingly likely to challenge the standards if they are required to
make capital investments or expenditures to comply with them. At the
same time, when tribal needs differ substantially fl'om those of the
surrounding state, as in the case of the Rio Grande paeblos, 68 creating
standards independently may be the only way for a t.ibe to realize the
goal of protecting its waters to serve particular tribal needs. It is here
that a tribe must be most careful to create scientifically defensible
standards, given the risk of costly litigation against the surrounding non-
Indian communities.
V. CONCLUSION
The power to regulate the reservation environment is a vital aspect of
tribal sovereignty. Tribes identify with their land in ways that non-
Indian society is only beginning to understand. Tribes' love for their
land could also lead to improvements in the reservation and neighboring
environments, since they seem likely to establish more stringent
standards than the surrounding states. The fruits of this enterprise could
also provide examples of prudent development on reservations that could
be helpful in similarly situated communities around the world. Though
conflicts with non-Indians seem inevitable, careful crafting of water
quality standards can be an important part of protecting tribal culture by
preserving and enhancing their remaining land base.
167. Id.
168. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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